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Abstract
Hierarchical access control policies are used to restrict access to objects by users based on
their respective security labels. There are many key assignment schemes in the literature
for implementing such policies using cryptographic mechanisms. Updating keys in such
schemes has always been problematic, not least because many objects may be encrypted
with the same key. We propose a number of techniques by which this process can be
improved, making use of the idea of lazy key updates, which have been studied in the
context of cryptographic file systems. We demonstrate in passing that schemes for lazy
key updates can be regarded as simple instances of key assignment schemes. Finally, we
illustrate the utility of our techniques by applying them to hierarchical file systems and
to temporal access control policies.
1 Introduction
Background An information flow policy associates each user and each object in a com-
puter system with a security label, where the set of security labels L is partially ordered,
and requires that a user must be at least as privileged as any object she reads. This is
widely known as the simple security property, which forms part of the Bell-LaPadula se-
curity model [5]. Algebraically, the simple security property is expressed in the following
way: for subject s to obtain read access to object o we require that λ(s) > λ(o), where
λ is a security function that associates an entity with a security label. The enforcement
of the simple security property is often referred to as hierarchical access control because
the partially ordered set of security labels can be represented as a hierarchy.
Although information flow policies were originally used in military systems, they have
many other practical applications, particularly if we regard the set of users as being
partitioned into a set of security classes, with each class being associated with a particular
security label. Such applications exist in many different environments, including secure
databases, broadcast services (such as Pay TV) and secure mail systems.
Key assignment schemes The use of encryption to enforce information flow policies
has been extensively studied; a recent survey paper identified and categorized over 30
schemes in the literature [11]. In such schemes, each security label is associated with
a unique cryptographic key: each object is encrypted with the key associated with the
object’s security label, and each user is given the key associated with her security label.
Moreover, each key can be used to derive the keys associated with lower security labels,
meaning that a user is required to store a single key. The problem of enforcing the infor-
mation flow policy thus becomes a problem of assigning keys in a way that is compatible
with the policy. For this reason such schemes are typically referred to as key assignment
schemes. We provide an overview of such schemes in Section 2.
Key updates A number of extensions have been proposed for key assignment schemes.
Perhaps the most common in the literature is the use of temporal constraints on the use
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of keys [3, 7, 9, 17, 23, 25]. In such schemes, keys are updated periodically and users are
able to derive the keys for certain authorized time intervals.
More importantly, it is necessary to update a key assignment scheme in at least two
other situations: when a key is compromised and when the association of a user with a
security label needs to be revoked. In the latter case, a user may be assigned to a lower
security level or an incomparable security level.1 There are three possible events that
require key updates.
• The key for level l ∈ L is compromised; in this case, all keys for labels less than or
equal to l need to be updated.
• A user assigned to level l is removed from the scheme; in this case, all keys for labels
less than or equal to l need to be updated.
• A user assigned to level l is assigned to a new security level l′; in this case, all keys
for labels less than or equal to l and that are not less than or equal to l′ need to be
updated.
Collectively we refer to these events as update events ; the (label) update set is the set of
labels for which new keys are required.
One possibility for key updates is that following an update event, for all l in the update
set, and for all u such that λ(u) = l, we immediately re-encrypt every object with security
label l and send u a copy of the new encryption key. An alternative is to postpone these
actions until it is absolutely necessary.
We have to assume that if a key κ requires updating, then any objects encrypted with
κ are available to any user who could derive κ. Hence, we may as well wait until the
contents of an object changes before re-encrypting it. Similarly, we may as well defer
sending a user u the new key κ′ until such time as u actually requires κ′ to decrypt an
object. This is sometimes referred to as lazy update and lazy re-encryption.
One technique for implementing lazy update is key regression [13]. Key regression
has been used in cryptographic file systems with Unix-like access control, in which each
file is associated with a group of users and encrypted with a group key; the group key
needs to updated when a user leaves the group. We believe that lazy update is even more
important in key assignment schemes, because more than one key may need to be changed
following an update event, and hence the problem of re-encrypting objects is exacerbated.
Contributions The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that key regression
schemes, and other techniques for supporting lazy update, are instances of key assignment
schemes (usually for very simple posets). We discuss key regression schemes and their
representation as key assignment schemes in Section 3.
The major contribution of this paper is to use ideas from schemes for lazy update
and from key assignment schemes to design several generic key assignment schemes that
support lazy update. This is the first such work in this area. We describe these schemes
in Section 4.
1We ignore the case when a user is assigned to a higher security level, because in this case, he can
simply be given the relevant key, which will enable him to recover all the keys to which he previously
had access.
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In Section 5 we illustrate the utility of the schemes in Section 4 by demonstrating
their application to cryptographic file systems and to temporal hierarchical access con-
trol. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize our contributions and discuss the numerous
opportunities for future work.
Notation Henceforth we adopt the following conventions: given a poset L and x, y ∈ L,
↓x denotes the set {y ∈ L, y 6 x}; we may write y < x if y 6 x and y 6= x; if y 6 x, we
may write x > y; y⋖xmeans that there does not exist z ∈ L such that y < z < x; we write
[m] to denote the set {0, . . . , m}; x, when used as input to some (cryptographic) function,
will denote a string identifying x ∈ L; E denotes a symmetric encryption algorithm, Ek(p)
denotes the encryption of plaintext p with key k; ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation;
s ‖ t denotes the concatenation of strings s and t; m | n means that integer m divides
integer n without remainder; (m,n) denotes the greatest common divisor of integers m
and n; in particular, (m,n) = 1 means that m and n are co-prime.
2 Key assignment schemes
A key assignment scheme is administered by the policy owner, often referred to as a trusted
center, who is responsible for generating and distributing keys, generating and managing
any public data required by the scheme and updating the scheme in the event of changes to
the policy. In addition to a key κ(x) for each security label x, a key assignment scheme may
also associate a secret value σ(x) with x and publish some information that is accessible
to all users of the scheme. This information can be used to derive the encryption key for
any lower security label. In other words, an object with security level y that has been
encrypted with the associated key κ(y) can be decrypted by any user with security level
x > y because the user can derive key κ(y) from κ(x), σ(x), and the public information.
We assume the existence of an RSA key generator, a randomized algorithm that takes
a security parameter k as input and outputs a triple (n, e, d) such that: n = pq, where
p and q are distinct odd primes; e ∈ Z∗
φ(n), where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1), e > 1, and
(e, φ(n)) = 1; d ∈ Z∗
φ(n), where ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n). We also assume the existence of an
associated hash function, which maps elements of Z∗n (in some standard representation)
to bit-strings of some desired length.
KASs require each user to store a key and (optionally) some secret information. They
also require storage for the public information. The other distinguishing feature of KASs
is whether κ(y) can be derived directly from κ(x), y 6 x, or whether it is an iterative
process.
In their survey paper, Crampton et al identify five different generic schemes, each
of which differ in terms of the amount of storage required by the user, storage required
for public information, and key derivation method [11]. Of these, two were identified as
having the best combination of characteristics. We discuss these schemes in the next two
sections.
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2.1 Iterative key encrypting key assignment schemes
An iterative key encrypting key assignment scheme (IKEKAS), uses the transitivity of
the partial order relation and “edge encryption”. The trusted center may choose any keys
from the key space and then defines Pub = {Eκ(x)(κ(y)) : y ⋖ x}.
A user with security label x can derive κ(y) by selecting a path from x to y in the
Hasse diagram2 of L and successively decrypting keys for labels on that path, until κ(y)
is recovered. The advantage of an IKEKAS is that the user is only required to store a
key. The disadvantage is that key derivation is necessarily iterative. There are a number
of IKEKASs in the literature [8, 10, 19, 20, 26, 27], and provably secure examples of
IKEKASs have recently been constructed by Atallah et al [2] and by Ateniese et al [3].
An example of an IKEKAS for a simple poset is given in Appendix A.1.
2.2 The Akl-Taylor scheme
The second generic scheme is a node-based key assignment scheme (NBKAS), of which
the best known, simplest, and most effective is the Akl-Taylor scheme [1]. Key derivation
in a NBKAS is direct and the user is only required to store a single key. The disadvantage
of a NBKAS is that key updates may be more disruptive than in an IKEKAS, because
keys are defined in terms of public information.
The earliest KAS (of any type) is due to Akl and Taylor. The trusted center:
• runs the RSA key generator to obtain (n, e, d), of which only n is used;
• chooses s at random from Z∗n;
• chooses a mapping φ : L→ N∗ such that φ(x) | φ(y) if and only if y 6 x;
• defines κ(x) = sφ(x) mod n;
• publishes {n} ∪ (φ(x) : x ∈ L).
A user with security label x can derive κ(y), y 6 x by computing
(
κ(x)
) φ(y)
φ(x) =
(
sφ(x)
)φ(y)
φ(x) = sφ(y) = κ(y).
An example of a NBKAS for a simple poset is given in Appendix A.2.
2.3 Key updates in KASs
We have already noted that an update to κ(x) generally requires κ(y) to be updated for
all y 6 x. Crampton et al note that none of the five generic schemes they identify (or the
30+ concrete instances of those generic schemes) enjoys any particular advantage with
respect to updating keys [11].
However, as in cryptographic file systems, many objects may be encrypted with the
same key. Therefore, we believe that a fruitful line of research is to construct generic
KASs that support lazy updates. We consider this problem in Section 4; first we discuss
lazy updates in cryptographic file systems.
2The Hasse diagram of L is the directed graph of the transitive, reflexive closure of the partial order
relation. In other words, it is the graph (L,⋖).
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3 Key regression and key assignment schemes
Key regression schemes have been used to support the revocation of keys shared by users of
a Unix-like file system in which files are encrypted [12]. If a user belonging to a particular
group leaves, then it is necessary to update the key(s) associated with members of that
group. Note that access to files is determined by the usual Unix permissions (not by a
hierarchical access control policy). The cryptographic element is introduced so that the
files may be stored on an untrusted server.
A key regression scheme (KRS) generates a sequence of keys that will be used to
encrypt the file, with the property that it is not possible to derive future keys from either
the current key or previous ones.3 However, it is possible to derive all previous keys from
the current one. The file attributes contain a flag, which indicates whether a key update
event has occurred. The next time the file is written, it is re-encrypted with the new key,
and when a user wishes to access the file, a copy of the new key is made available. Similar
techniques have been explored by Backes et al [4].
We now show that we can model a KRS as a KAS. We describe KR-RSA, the
preferred KRS of Fu et al , using our generic framework.
We use the poset (N,6), where N denotes the set of natural numbers with the usual
ordering. We write κi to denote the key associated with i ∈ N and si to denote the secret
associated with i ∈ N. The intuition is that κi is the key used to encrypt the file during
the period between ith update event and the (i+1)th update event.4 The trusted center
• runs the RSA key generator to produce (n, e, d);
• chooses s at random from Z∗n;
• defines σ0 = s, σi = σ
d
i−1 mod n;
• defines κi = h(σi), where h is a suitable hash function;
• publishes {n, e}.
To compute κj from κi, j < i, the user successively computes σi−1, . . . , σj using the fact
that σt−1 = σ
e
t (since σ
e
t = (σ
d
t−1)
e mod n = σt−1), and finally computes h(σj) to obtain
κj . In other words, this is simply a variant of an IKEKAS, albeit with very modest public
storage requirements.
It is worth noting that the hash function is only required to defeat certain attack
models. We could simply define κi = κ
d
i−1 mod n, thereby obtaining a true IKEKAS. It
would not be feasible for a user with κi to recover κj , j > i, because this would imply
that there existed a feasible method for solving the RSA problem.5
3Such a scheme is rather similar to one-time password schemes, which generate passwords by succes-
sively hashing a random seed and use the resulting passwords in reverse order of their generation [14].
4Fu et al present three concrete schemes, two of which are essentially KASs that limit the number of
update events. Such schemes can be modeled as KASs using the poset ([m],6), for some m > 1.
5Fu et al included σi and use h to derive keys from σi, because the resulting keys are actually encrypted
with users’ public keys and they wanted the whole scheme to have the property of key indistinguishability.
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4 Key assignment schemes for lazy updates
In this section we define a number of KASs that support lazy updates. In other words,
different objects with the same security label may have been encrypted with different
keys. A user u must be able to derive all the encryption keys in use for all labels l 6 λ(u).
We assume there are a number of update events indexed by the natural numbers, and
that the ith key is used to re-encrypt objects between the ith and (i+1)th update event;
we write κi(x) to denote the ith key for security label x.
6 In other words, a user u in time
interval i can derive any key in the set {κj(l) : l 6 λ(u), 0 6 j 6 i}.
4.1 Na¨ıve approach
The simplest way of constructing a scheme in which keys are refreshed periodically (for
example, after an update event), is to construct a KAS for the poset L × [m], where m
denotes the maximum number of update events and (y, j) 6 (x, i) if and only if y 6 x
and j 6 i. Obviously, m must be chosen in advance by the trusted center.
One disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting poset L×[m] (whose cardinality
is (m+1)|L|) is likely to be very large. A large number of keys will need to be generated
and a large amount of public information, proportional to the number of edges in the
Hasse diagram of L, must be maintained.
4.2 NBKAS
The Akl-Taylor scheme is often criticized because it is claimed that it is difficult to change
a key if it is compromised (see [2, 15], for example). It is certainly true that it is easier
to change a key in an IKEKAS, because the keys are chosen independently of the public
information. However, it is usually the case that a set of keys needs to be changed
following an update event, and the Akl-Taylor scheme is generally no more difficult than
an IKEKAS to update [11]. Moreover, the Akl-Taylor scheme has one distinct advantage,
which is that it is possible to update all the keys, simply by choosing a new system secret;
no public information needs to change, unlike any IKEKAS or direct key encrypting key
assignment scheme [11].
Using this observation, we propose a scheme in which all keys are updated following
an update event. Initially, the trusted center
• runs the RSA key generator to obtain n;
• chooses a system secret s0 ∈ Z
∗
n at random;
• defines a mapping φ : L→ N∗ such that φ(x) | φ(y) if and only if y 6 x;
• publishes {n} ∪ {φ(x) : x ∈ L};
• defines κ0(x) = s
φ(x)
0 mod n.
Following the ith update event, the trusted center
• chooses a new system secret si ∈ Z
∗
n, where (si, sj) = 1 for all j < i;
6The scheme is initialized following the 0th update event.
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• defines κi(x) = s
φ(x)
i mod n.
A user with security label x can derive κj(y), y 6 x, using κj(x) and the public informa-
tion.
A significant advantage of this scheme is that the number of update events does not
need to be defined before the scheme is instantiated. Of course, the user now accumulates
keys as the scheme develops, so private storage requirements increase. The other disad-
vantage with this scheme is that all keys are updated following each update event, unlike
in the na¨ıve approach. We refer to this feature as synchronous scheme update (SSU).
4.3 KRS/NBKAS
A refinement of the scheme above is to use a KRS for generating new system secrets. The
scheme is initialized in the same was as before. However, following the ith update event,
the trusted center
• computes a new system secret si = s
d
i−1 mod n;
• defines κi(x) = s
φ(x)
i mod n.
With this scheme, the user only needs to retain the most recent key; he can derive
κj(y) from κi(x), y 6 x, j 6 i, by first computing κi(y) from the public information, and
then iteratively computing κj′(y), i > j
′ > j.
4.4 NBKAS/IKEKAS
For this scheme, the trusted center must choose m in advance. The basic idea is to define
a NBKAS to generate a sequence of keys {κi(x) : 0 6 i 6 m} for each x ∈ L. Again, we
assume the use of a suitable RSA key generator that outputs n (e and d are not used).
For each x ∈ L, the trusted center
• chooses a secret s(x) ∈ Z∗n, such that (s(x), s(y)) = 1 if and only if x = y;
• defines κj(x) =
(
s(x)
)2m−j
mod n.
Each of these schemes is an instance of the Akl-Taylor scheme for [m], where φ(i) = 2m−i.
Clearly, φ(i) | φ(j) if and only if j 6 i; in fact, φ(j)/φ(i) = 2i−j.
We use the keys derived in the construction of the above family of schemes to construct
a further family of schemes; for each i ∈ T , define Pubi = {Eκi(x)(κi(y)) : y ⋖ x}. In
other words, for each time period, we construct an IKEKAS for L. The trusted center
publishes Pubi following the ith update event; all previous public information can be
destroyed. The trusted center must also publish the generation number i.
In order to recover κj(y), given κi(x), with y 6 x and j < i, the user first computes
κi(y) using the IKEKAS. The user then computes
(
κi(y)
)2i−j
= κj(y), since
(
κi(y)
)2i−j
=
(
κi(y)
) 2m−j
2m−i =
(
s(y)2
m−i) 2m−j
2m−i = s(y)2
m−j
= κj(y).
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Interval 1
Interval i
Interval i+1
Figure 1: A stack of IKEKASs
Figure 1 illustrates schematically how the scheme develops over time. The stack defines
a “virtual” family of KASs; only the public information for the top of the stack is required
and public information for all earlier schemes can be discarded.
We note that the NBKAS defined for {κi(x) : 0 6 i 6 m} could be used as a KRS.
It offers a number of advantages over KR-RSA. In particular, key derivation is direct
and no public information is required. Given that key derivation is iterative and uses
exponentiation in KR-RSA, direct derivation may well be useful in practice. The one
disadvantage is that the trusted center has to specify the maximum number of updates
in advance.
4.5 IKEKAS/IKEKAS
As an alternative to NBKAS/IKEKAS, we can use an IKEKAS instead of a NBKAS. For
each x ∈ L, the trusted center
• for each i, chooses a key κi(x);
• computes {Eκi(x)(κi−1(x)) : i = 1, . . . , m}.
Following the ith revocation, the trusted center publishes Pubi for the ith IKEKAS, as
in Scheme 2. In addition, the trusted center also publishes {Eκi(x)(κi−1(x)) : x ∈ L}. The
public information following the ith revocation is Pubi ∪ {Eκj(x)(κj−1(x)) : j = 1, . . . , i}.
In order to recover κj(y), given κi(x), with y 6 x and j < i, the user first computes
κi(y) using the IKEKAS. The user then iteratively derives κj′(y), i > j
′ > j, using the
public information for y’s IKEKAS.
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4.6 ASU NBKAS/IKEKAS
Of course the method of updating keys used in the schemes described thus far (with the
exception of the na¨ıve approach) is undesirable in some ways. In particular, every key is
updated following a update event. This means that all keys will subsequently need to be
distributed to users, even when lazy revocation and lazy re-encryption is employed. In
short, all the schemes have SSU. We now describe a scheme with asynchronous scheme
update (ASU).
We assume that the trusted center has already constructed a NBKAS/IKEKAS as in
Section 4.4. Suppose that we need to update the keys in the update set U ⊆ L. In this
case, following a update event, the trusted center
• for each x ∈ U , replaces κ(x) in the IKEKAS with the next κ(x) defined in the
NBKAS for x;
• refreshes the public information by re-computing {Eκ(x)(κ(y)) : y ∈ U, x ∈ L, y⋖x}.
In addition, the trusted center will need to maintain a public list, indicating how many
times each key has been refreshed.
Figure 2 illustrates how such a scheme would evolve over time. We have four security
labels a, b, c, d, where d ⋖ b ⋖ a and d ⋖ c ⋖ a. Prior to any updates, a single key exists
for each security label. A user with security label d is then removed from the scheme,
meaning that κ(d) has to be refreshed. Since d is the minimal element in the poset, no
other keys need to be changed. We must recompute the public information Eκ(b)(κ(d)) and
Eκ(c)(κ(d)), the “edge encryptions” for (d, b) and (d, c). This is depicted in Figure 2(b), in
which labels in the update set are shown as unfilled nodes, and edges for which the public
information must be updated are shown as broken lines. Then a user with security label b
is removed from the scheme, meaning that κ(b) has to be refreshed. Since d < b, we must
also refresh κ(b). In addition, we must re-compute all edges from elements immediately
greater than either b or d. This is shown in Figure 2(c). Notice that if, instead of removing
the user with security label b from the scheme, we changed her security label to c, then
the update set is {b} rather than {b, d} (since d < c); in this case, we would only update
κ(b) and re-compute Eκ(a)(κ(b)) and Eκ(b)(κ(d)).
It should be noted that many updates for label l will result in an update set ↓l. In
some scenarios, it may be simpler to use SSU. However, if we can assume (or know) that
most of the update activity will be for relatively junior security labels, then there may
well be a distinct advantage to using this incremental approach. This may well be a
reasonable assumption: there will probably be fewer users with relatively senior labels,
and those users are probably less likely to be re-assigned to new security labels or removed
from the scheme. Note also that the amount of public information remains constant, and
is proportional to the number of edges in the Hasse diagram of L. Of course, we can use
a similar method to construct an ASU IKEKAS/IKEKAS scheme.
4.7 KRS/IKEKAS
A disadvantage of NBKAS/IKEKAS and IKEKAS/IKEKAS is that m, the maximum
number of key revocations for any particular security label, must be chosen in advance.
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cb
(a) No updates
a
d
cb
(b) κ(d) is updated
a
d
cb
(c) κ(b) is updated
Figure 2: Incremental key updates
In this scheme we construct a hybrid scheme using a KRS and an IKEKAS. Initially, for
each label x ∈ L, the trusted center
• runs the RSA key generator to produce (n, e, d);
• chooses secret s(x) at random from Z∗n;
• defines κ0(x) = s(x);
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• publishes {n, e};
• constructs an IKEKAS for L.
Following the ith key revocation for security label x, the trusted center
• computes, κi(x) = κ
d
i−1 mod n;
• replaces κi−1(x) in the IKEKAS with κi(x);
• updates the public information for the IKEKAS.
This scheme can also be used in ASU mode.
4.8 Security considerations
4.8.1 IKEKASs
Ateniese et al recently examined the security of IKEKASs [3]. They introduce the notions
of key recovery and key indistinguishability, which correspond to plaintext recovery and
plaintext indistinguishability in conventional security analyses. Key indistinguishability
is an important consideration in IKEKASs because keys are encrypted and stored in the
public information. Ateniese et al considered active and passive adversaries and showed
an active adversary has no advantage over a passive one for either key recovery or key
indistinguishability.
7Note that, unlike the original scheme of Fu et al , we do not use hash functions to compute keys from
secrets. Instead, we compute keys directly; key indistinguishability is not an issue here.
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An IKEKAS is secure against key recovery if the algorithm used to encrypt keys
(stored in Pub) is secure with respect to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack, in which
a polynomial-time adversary has access to an encryption oracle (but not to a decryption
oracle) and wins if it can recover the plaintext from a challenge ciphertext with non-
negligible advantage (PR-P1-CO [3]).
An IKEKAS is secure in the sense of key indistinguishability if the algorithm used to
encrypt keys is secure with respect to a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack, in which
a polynomial-time adversary has access to an encryption oracle and wins if it can deter-
mine with non-negligible advantage which of two plaintexts yielded a challenge ciphertext
(IND-P1-CO [18]).
In other words, the security properties of an IKEKAS appear to be dependent only
on the security properties of the algorithm used to encrypt keys stored in Pub.
4.8.2 NBKASs
NBKASs are different from IKEKASs in that no encrypted keys are stored in the public
information. This means that key indistinguishability is not an issue.
The Akl-Taylor scheme, which is the NBKAS we will use throughout this paper,
remains one of the few schemes with a formal proof that it is collusion secure: that is,
for any x ∈ L, it is not feasible to derive κ(x) from any (sub)set of {κ(y) : y 6> x} [1].
This is analogous to the fact that an adversary can obtain the key for any label provided
it cannot be used to derive the desired key in the key recovery analysis by Ateniese et
al . The Akl-Taylor scheme is collusion secure based on the assumption that it is hard to
compute integral roots mod n.
4.8.3 Hybrid schemes for lazy updates
Space constraints preclude a formal security analysis of the schemes proposed in this
paper. We hope to prove in future work that the hybrid schemes are as secure as the
components from which they are constructed (using methods analogous to those of Ate-
niese et al for IKEKASs). Given that there exist KASs with known security properties, we
would then have a “recipe” for instantiating provably secure hybrid schemes that support
lazy updates.
4.9 Summary and comparison
We summarize the features of the schemes described above in Table 1: we write “Dir” to
denote direct key derivation and “Ind” to denote indirect key derivation; E denotes the
edge set in the Hasse diagram of L; the “bounded” column indicates whether a maximum
number of updates is specified when the scheme is instantiated; v denotes that a user is
required to store v keys after v updates; the storage required is proportional to the value
given in the table (the constant of proportionality being determined by the cryptographic
primitives chosen).
It is difficult to make a definitive statement about which of these schemes is the best,
because “best” may depend on the context in which a scheme is to be deployed. In an
11
Scheme Derivation Storage Bounded ASU/SSU
Public Private
Na¨ıve Scheme dependent Yes ASU/SSU
NBKAS Dir |L| v No SSU
KRS/NBKAS Dir + Ind |L| 1 No SSU
NBKAS/IKEKAS Dir + Ind |E| 1 Yes ASU/SSU
IKEKAS/IKEKAS Ind + Ind |E|+m|L| 1 Yes ASU/SSU
KRS/IKEKAS Ind + Ind |E| 1 No ASU/SSU
Table 1: A summary of key assignment schemes for lazy updates
ideal world, a scheme would have direct key derivation, low storage costs, be unbounded,
and support ASU. Of course, none of these schemes have all these features.
If update events are likely to be rare, then it is probably better to select a scheme with
bounded updates, because the key derivation methods are often more efficient. If, on the
other hand, it is not appropriate to bound the number of updates, then KRS/IKEKAS
offers a nice combination of features.
5 Applications
5.1 Cryptographic file systems
We assume that we have a file system and that we wish to control access to those files.
Directories are special types of files that are used to arrange the file system in a tree-like
hierarchy. In order to access a file, it is necessary to have access to the directory that
contains the file. Every file has a unique pathname, constructed by traversing a path from
the root directory to the file, and concatenating the node identifiers, separated by some
suitable character. We will use the familiar Unix-style notation for pathnames. Hence
/users/dave/foo.c is the pathname of the file foo.c, which is contained in the dave
directory, itself contained in the users directory, which is in the root directory.
We wish to use hierarchical access control policies to control access to such a file
system. We will implement these policies using a KAS.
5.1.1 Implementing a hierarchical access control policy
We model a hierarchical file system as a partially ordered set (F ,4), where F denotes
the set of files in the file system. Given two files f1 and f2, f1 4 f2 if and only if the
pathname of f2 is a substring of the pathname of f1. (In other words, f1 is contained in
some (sub)directory of f2.)
An access control policy for F is defined to be a function λ : F → L, where L is
some set of security labels. We say the policy λ is consistent if for all f1, f2 ∈ F such
that f1 4 f2, λ(f1) > λ(f2). Intuitively, a consistent policy applies at least as high a
security label to a file as the security label for each of the directories in which that file is
contained. In other words, it is consistent with the usual access control semantics for file
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systems, where access to a file is denied if access is denied to any directory in the file’s
pathname. In what follows, we only consider consistent policies.
We can now apply a KAS to L to obtain encryption keys for the files in F . We assign
labels to users who wish to access files in F . The advantage of this approach is that any
consistent policy automatically enforces access control requirements for hierarchical file
systems. Moreover, different files in the same directory can be given different security
labels.
5.1.2 Role-based access control
This type of approach could be used to implement a limited form of cryptographically
enforced role-based access control for hierarchical file systems. The security function λ
acts as both a user-role and permission-role assignment relation. In this case, each user
is assigned to a single role. However, there is no reason why we can’t define a relation
Λ : U × L. In this case, users would require one or more keys, rather than a single key.
Obviously, we can not extend λ to a relation for objects, because this would imply that an
object could be associated with two or more labels, whereas an object is only encrypted
with one key.
5.1.3 Read-write access
It is rather easy to extend this type of scheme to discriminate between read-only and
read-write access. This is something that many cryptographic file systems cannot do,
because a single symmetric encryption key is associated with each file.
Specifically, we (logically) extend F to include two entries for each normal file f (that
is, one that isn’t a directory): fr for read access to the file, and fw for write access. We
define fw ≺ fr, which means that for any consistent policy λ, λ(fw) > λ(fr). In other
words, any user with security label λ(fw) can write to f , and can also deduce the key for
λ(fr). In contrast, a user with label λ(fr) can only read the file.
In a practical implementation, any user with read access would be able to change f in
memory, but would need to compute a checksum before the file is written back to disk.
This would be implemented using κ(λ(fw)) as input to a keyed hash function in order to
compute the checksum. The file system can verify the correctness of the checksum and
only write the file to disk if it has been computed correctly (that is, with the correct key).
This is the approach adopted in the cryptographic storage file system (CSFS) [12], for
example. However, CSFS only has a single key associated with a file, meaning that any
user who can read the file can also write to it.
5.1.4 Comparison with related work
We have already noted that we can quite easily offer discriminated read and read-write
access to files, unlike existing approaches. In addition, we can significantly reduce the
number of keys in use. Existing approaches partition the file system and associate a group
key with each set of files in the partition [4, 12]. A Unix-like access control policy is used
to determine which group the file is associated with and which users should have access
to the file. A group key is encrypted with the public key of each member of the group.
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The hierarchical access control policy allows us to simplify the access control policy and
to deal with hierarchical file systems in a very natural way. The disadvantage of our
approach is that all files are “owned” by the system, not individual users. However, this
is a feature of mandatory and role-based access control policies.
5.2 KAS for temporal access control
Temporal access control adds a further dimension to access control policies, by limiting
the time for which certain rights are authorized. This has been explored in the context of
role-based access control [6] and access control mechanisms for broadcast XML data [7],
and is supported in XACML [21]. Typically, some unit of time is split into smaller intervals
(days into hours, years into months, etc) and users are authorized for some continuous
period of time comprising one or more smaller intervals. A user might be authorized to
access files only between the hours of 9am and 6pm, for example.
One application of these schemes is to implement temporal access control to published
XML data. Different parts of the content are encrypted with different keys. Subscribers
are given the keys that will enable them to decrypt the content during the time intervals
for which they have paid subscription fees [7].
So called “time-bound” KASs have attempted to add this temporal dimension to
KASs. Such schemes have been widely studied [3, 7, 9, 17, 23], but many of these schemes
have been shown to be insecure [16, 24, 25], and are often rather complicated. We now
show that the schemes defined in Section 4 to support lazy updates can be used, either
directly or with some minor modification, to construct KASs for temporal hierarchical
access control policies.
We assume that there are m time intervals and that a user will be given access for i
consecutive time intervals 1 6 i 6 m. (Hence, there are m + 1 time points, t0, . . . , tm,
which denote the beginning/end points of time intervals.) We write [i, j] to denote the
time period between ti−1 and tj , j > i. There are
1
2
m(m + 1) such intervals. The set of
intervals, which we denote Im has a natural partial ordering that respects the semantics
of temporal access control: [i, j] 6 [i′, j′] if and only if i > i′ and j 6 j′. We write κi(x),
1 6 i 6 m, to denote the key for security label x during interval i.
5.2.1 Na¨ıve approach
The simplest way to implement a temporal KAS is to construct a normal KAS for the
poset L × Im. This is analogous to Scheme 0 in Section 4. Of course, the scheme will
require a considerable amount of public storage.
5.2.2 NBKAS
The second possibility is to simply use the NBKAS from Section 4.2. The trusted center
initially:
• runs the RSA key generator to obtain n;
• chooses a system secret s1 ∈ Z
∗
n at random;
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• defines a mapping φ : L→ N∗ such that φ(x) | φ(y) if and only if y 6 x;
• publishes {n} ∪ {φ(x) : x ∈ L};
• defines κ1(x) = s
φ(x)
1 mod n;
• distributes κ1(x) to every user with security label x authorized in period 1.
As before, a user with security label x can use κ1(x) to compute κ1(y) for all y 6 x.
At the beginning of the ith time period, the trusted center:
• chooses a system secret si ∈ Z
∗
n at random, where (si, sj) = 1, j < i;
• defines κi(x) = s
φ(x)
i mod n;
• distributes κi(x) to every user with security label x authorized in period i.
It is clear that a user with security label x can use the same public information, the same
derivation method, and the new key to derive κi(y) for all y 6 x.
In fact, this scheme can be employed even if users are not authorized for a contiguous
time period. The trusted center simply distributes keys if the user is authorized for a
particular interval at the beginning of that interval. A further advantage of this scheme
is that keys can be “drip-fed” to users. Hence, it is not necessary to update keys if a
user is removed from the scheme. (This is based on the assumption that the applications
for which temporal access control is envisaged would write and encrypt the content only
once.)
5.2.3 Comparison with related work
Bertino et al proposed the use of a KAS to implement temporal hierarchical access control
policies [7]. However, the KAS they use [23] has been shown to be insecure [25].
Ateniese et al propose two schemes for temporal access control. Given L and m, both
schemes require the construction of a new poset. The first scheme is an IKEKAS defined
for the poset L′ = (L × Im) ∪ (L × [m]), where (x, y) 6 (x
′, y′) if and only if x 6 x′
(in L), y ∈ [m], y′ ∈ Im and y ∈ y
′. It can be shown that the number of edges in L′ is
O(pm3), where p is the cardinality of the partial order relation in L. Hence, the amount
of public information that needs to be stored (which is proportional to the cardinality of
the number of edges in an IKEKAS) may be large.
The second scheme is a direct key encrypting key assignment scheme, but it also
requires that a user store secret values, one for each of the time intervals for which he
is authorized to have access. Keys are obtained and derived (in one step) by computing
bilinear mappings. This scheme is defined for the poset Lr ∪ Ll, where L = Lr = Ll (as
sets) and x 6 y if and only if x ∈ Ll, y ∈ Lr and x 6 y (in L). (An illustration of this
construction is shown in Figure 3.) In this case, the number of edges in L′ is O(|L|2).
Although the amount of public information that needs to be stored is independent of m,
it is still proportional to the square of |L|.
The use of bilinear mappings seems somewhat arbitrary: any other encryption scheme
with appropriate security properties would appear to work just as well; indeed, the same
poset transformation and an Akl-Taylor scheme for the transformed poset has been de-
scribed previously [22]. The motivation for using bilinear mappings appears to be that
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the size of each datum of public information is constant (and occupies 171 bits). However,
we note that the scheme proposed by Atallah et al [2], and illustrated in Appendix A.1,
employs hash functions, and each datum occupies only 160 bits in a typical implementa-
tion.
In our NBKAS approach, the amount of public information is proportional to L. It
has been shown that we can choose |L| primes and a function φ such that, φ(x) occupies
|L| bits [11] (see also Appendix A.2). Additional storage is required to store |L| primes,
each of which occupies log |L| bits. In other words, the overall public storage requirement
is |L|(log |L|+1) bits. Given that the bilinear mapping scheme of Ateniese et al requires
O(|L|2) items of public information, our scheme compares rather favorably. Figure 3
illustrates a simple poset and the corresponding poset that needs to be constructed for
the scheme of Ateniese et al based on bilinear mappings.
a
d
cb
(a) Simple poset
a b c d
a' b' c' d'
(b) “Bilinear poset”
Figure 3: Constructing the poset for the bilinear mapping KAS
We also note that we can drop the requirement that m is known in advance in our
approach, assuming that the number of intervals that will ever be used is very small
compared to n. This may be useful if the temporal access control policy is cyclical. In
other words, the same hierarchical access control policy applies to each block of intervals.
(We might require that users with a particular security label can access content every
Monday, for example, and the content published on Monday requires different encryption
keys each week.) Policies of this nature have been used by Bertino et al in the setting
of role-based access control. However, we are not aware of any previous work on the
implementation of cyclical temporal hierarchical access control policies using KASs.
6 Conclusion
Updating keys is known to be an issue in situations where the same encryption key is used
to encrypt many different data objects. This problem occurs in cryptographic storage file
systems, where techniques such as key regression have been used so that re-encryption
of data objects is not necessarily performed when the encryption key is refreshed. The
problem is even more pressing in key assignment schemes for hierarchical access control, in
which a number of different keys may need to change at the same point in time, meaning
that even higher volumes of data may need to be re-encrypted at some point. We have
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proposed a number of different generic key assignment schemes that support the idea
of lazy re-encryption. These are the first such schemes in the literature, and represent a
considerable advance on existing approaches to key updates in KASs. We have also shown
that key regression techniques used in cryptographic file systems are also KASs. Finally
we have demonstrated that KASs with lazy updates have a number of useful applications.
Nevertheless, a number of opportunities for further work exist. We have not include
a formal security analysis for any of our schemes. There are a number of reasons for
this. First, we felt the most important contribution of this paper was to introduce the
idea of lazy updates for key assignment schemes and to define generic constructions to
support lazy updates. Nearly all papers on key assignment schemes describe a scheme
with particular cryptographic primitives and prove the scheme is secure. We feel it is
more useful to identify the characteristics of a generic scheme; the security analysis can
follow for instantiations of the generic scheme using particular cryptographic mechanisms.
Second, the space limitations preclude any substantial analysis. Instead, we have noted
that there do exist provably secure IKEKASs, NBKASs and KRSs in the literature. In
future work, we hope to prove that our generic constructions to support lazy updates
are as secure as the components from which they are constructed. In other words, the
KRS/NBKAS construction, for example, is secure from in the sense of key recovery and
key indistinguishability if the KRS and NBKAS are.
Finally, it would of considerable practical interest to adapt the architecture used in
cryptographic file systems and implement a key assignment scheme for a hierarchical file
system. Similarly, it would interesting to use XML encryption to implement hierarchical
access control for XML data.
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A Some concrete key assignment schemes
In the interests of concreteness, we describe an IKEKAS and a NBKAS for the simple
poset shown in Figure 4.
a
d
cb
Figure 4: A simple poset
A.1 An IKEKAS based on the scheme of Atallah et al
We choose an integer l and a hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l and define the key space
to be {0, 1}l. We then choose four keys κ(a), . . . , κ(d) at random from the key space.
Finally, we publish {κ(y)− h(κ(x) ‖ y) : y ⋖ x}, which equals
{κ(b)− h(κ(a) ‖ b), κ(c)− h(κ(a) ‖ c), κ(d)− h(κ(b) ‖ d), κ(d)− h(κ(c) ‖ d)}.
A user with κ(a) can derive κ(d), for example: he first computes h(κ(a) ‖ b) and hence
derives κ(b) from the relevant public information; and then computes κ(d) using a similar
method and κ(b).
A.2 An Akl-Taylor scheme
We first define a mapping χ : L → 2L, where χ(x) = L \ ↓x. We also define a mapping
pi : L → {2, 3, 5, 7}, where pi(a) = 2, pi(b) = 3, pi(c) = 5 and pi(d) = 7; we extend this
to a mapping pi : 2L → N∗, where pi(X) =
∏
x∈X pi(x). Finally, we define the mapping
φ : L→ N∗, where φ(x) = pi(χ(x)). Hence, we have φ(a) = 1, φ(b) = 2.5, φ(c) = 2.3 and
φ(d) = 2.3.5. By construction, φ(x) | φ(y) if and only if y 6 x.
We use an RSA key generator to produce n = pq, and then select a system secret s ∈
Z∗n. We define κ(x) = s
φ(x) mod n. Finally, we publish n and the mappings pi and χ. A
user with κ(a) can derive κ(d), by computing (mod n) κ(a)
φ(d)
φ(a) = κ(a)φ(d) = sφ(d) = κ(d).
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